The
outcome of the Swedish parliamentary election on 9 September confirms
a general European trend: rising right-wing populism and a weakening
Social Democracy. The traditional picture of Sweden as the home of a
progressive social democratic welfare state has been fading away for
several decades now.
The
outcome of the Swedish parliamentary election on 9 September confirms
a general European trend: rising rightwing populism and a weakening
Social Democracy. The traditional picture of Sweden as the home of a
progressive social democratic welfare state has been fading away for
several decades now.
Since
at least the deep crisis of the Swedish economy in the early 1990s
the Social Democratic party has accepted the general outlines of a
neo-liberal economic policy including deregulations and
privatizations of the public sector. At the same time the once so
impressive party organization has been strongly weakened—the party
has lost two-thirds of its members during the last two decades and
the closely affiliated blue-collar trade-union confederation LO has
lost 25 per cent during the last 10 years. The party, which during
there previous 85 years had been out of government for only nine,
lost power to a right-wing government in 2006.
During
the following eight years this government stepped up the pace in
undermining the public sector through increasing privatizations and
tax cuts. When the Social Democrats came back to power in 2014 they
did so in an extremely weakened position. The party, that for a long
time used to get around 45% of the votes, just reached 3 %. Together
with its co-party in government, the Green Party, and with the
parliamentary support of the Left Party, the government still was a
minority government. And it had neither the ambition nor the power to
fundamentally change the policy of the outgoing government. The most
spectacular outcome of the 2014 election was the rise of the right
populist Sweden Democrats. They succeeded in doubling their vote to
13%, which meant that none of the traditional political blocs were
able to form a majority.
Unlike
its twin parties in Denmark and Norway the Sweden Democrats has its
roots in openly racist and pro-Nazi organisations. Since the late
1990s a new generation of young leaders has successfully managed to
build an effective party organization, starting from some local
strongholds in southern Sweden. Xenophobia and anti-immigration have
been the main ideological platform of the party and the main reason
for being able to win voters. As it has increased its parliamentary
influence the party has made efforts to downplay the more openly
racist rhetoric, expelling some of the most eager representatives.
The party has also lately tried to stress the national-conservative
features of the party, approaching similar currents in Poland and
Hungary. Their economic and welfare policy is close to that of the
Conservative Party.
For
a long time there was a de facto agreement between the traditional
parties in the parliament to try to isolate the Sweden Democrats and
to abstain from negotiation with them. This was why the right wing
parties accepted the red-green coalition in 2014. The huge wave of
refugees in 2014 and 2015—80 000 and 160 000 respectively came to
Sweden—changed the political situation almost overnight.
Until
October 2015 there was a broad consensus that the Swedes were
prepared to “open their hearts”—to quote former Conservative
Party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt. Initially only Sweden Democrats
criticized the massive immigration. When the party started to grow
and the shortcomings in the organization of the reception of refugees
became obvious most leading parties, including the Social Democracy
agreed to make an immediate stop and adjust Swedish immigration
policy to the minimum criteria of the EU. The change was not only a
formal adaptation, it was accompanied by a rise in anti-immigrant
sentiments, anti-Muslim agitation and demands for tougher legislation
directed towards what was claimed to be crimes related to immigrants
coming also from the traditional parties, including the Social
Democrats in government.
It
is obvious that one reason for this change was the threat both Social
Democrats and Conservatives felt from the Sweden Democrats. As could
be foreseen from experiences from other countries the change of
tactics did not work. The Sweden Democrats continued to grow at the
expense of especially these two parties. The outcome of the election
confirms this conclusion. The Social Democrats fell to 28%, their
lowest result since suffrage was won in 1921. The Conservatives lost
even more, 3.5 %. And the Sweden Democrats gained almost 5%, to 17.5
%. In a European perspective this result is perhaps not staggering.
Sweden is adjusting to an international trend.
In
a Swedish perspective however this is a new situation and the outcome
is a serious setback in several regards. Two should be mentioned
here. The first is the threat of a real influence from the Sweden
Democrats over day-to-day governmental policy. There is at this
moment a stalemate between the two traditional political blocs: who
will be the next Prime Minister could be decided by the Sweden
Democrats. The demarcation line that has existed until now between
the traditional political parties and the xenophobic right-wing
populists does not exist anymore. It is obvious that the
Conservatives are prepared to enter formal or informal negotiations
with the Sweden Democrats to be able to form a rightwing government.
The Danish experiences shows how disastrous consequence could be
letting such parties set the agenda.
The
other setback is related to the left and the working class. It is
true that the Left Party—former Communists—made substantial gains
– from 5.7 to 7.9 % and above all were able to make an impressive
election campaign among young people. However, the left has never
been as weak as today, only around 35 %. And a majority of the
working class is not voting left any more. Thirty years ago, 80% of
the working class voted Social Democrats (and another 10%
Communists). In 2014 still 50% of the members in LO voted Social
Democrats. In 2018 only 37% voted for them (and another 10% for the
Left Party).
It
is obvious that the main reason why the Social Democrats have lost
their stronghold inside the working class is that they have abdicated
from what used to be their main strength: the defence of a welfare
state built on equality and solidarity. Nothing indicates that they
have learned that lesson. The main aim of the party leadership is to
solve the present situation by trying to form a coalition with
bourgeois parties, which would mean a further weakening of the
welfare state and more attacks on the rights of the working class.
>>
The article above is by Kjell Östberg, who is a long-standing member
of the Socialist Party, Swedish section of the Fourth International
(since 1968). He is now Professor in History at Södertörns
University (in Stockholm).
No comments:
Post a Comment